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I. INTRODUCTION

Plan of the Paper
Since the cost of pricing is the controversial premise of the argument, we will devote the Section II to a discussion of the nature of these costs. The optimal classes and their determinants are characterized in Section III, while Section IV asks whether classes should be designed by sellers or buyers. The paper ends with a brief discussion in Section V.
II. THE COSTS OF PRICING
Arguments about pricing costs are often objected to with proposals to use alternative trading mechanisms. Since no single class of pricing costs, such as those incurred in connection with bargaining or signage, apply convincingly to all ways of determining prices, the players can avoid any specific problem by using some other mechanism.
We will here offer a four-pronged counter-argument. First, there are many types of pricing costs and the argument does not depend on any one type being important.
Second, while the existence of mechanisms without pricing costs is a theoretical possibility, widely used practices, such as bargaining and take-it-or-leave-it ("posted") offers, arguably entail several important types of pricing costs. Whatever the reasons for their use, the prevalence of these mechanisms makes it important to study the implications of the associated pricing costs. Third, and perhaps more speculatively, the existence of a cost-free mechanism is immaterial unless the players can use a cost-free mechanism to agree to use it. Fourth, even if pricing costs are unimportant in many applications, they could still be critical in others.
Aiming to make the first two prongs of the argument, we now offer a brief literature survey to document the existence and importance of several pricing costs associated with bargaining and posted price mechanisms.
Bargaining Costs
Some version of alternating offer bargaining is commonly used to determine prices under conditions with a flavor of bilateral monopoly. Examples include big ticket consumer goods, industrial products, employment contracts, and other services. Because the idea is to make a list of the costs associated with this price determination process, we will group them in three categories.
1. Costs associated with the bargaining process itself. Any explicit model of alternating offer bargaining must posit some costs of refusing an offer and making a counter, since the process otherwise would go on ad infinitum. Delays are strictly out-ofequilibrium outcomes in the most simple models (Rubinstein, 1982) , but not in richer settings (Watson, 1998) .
Perhaps more importantly, it is obvious that bargaining often does take quite a bit of time in the real world. The costs of this time include the salary of bargainers, the loss from delays in trade, and the disutility many people feel from participating in the backand-forth process (think of asking for a raise or buying a car). At a more aggregate level, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (May, 2005) estimates that there are 69,300 Purchasing Managers in the US each making an average of $81,440 per year. Since a survey by Purchasing Magazine suggests that these managers spend 15% of their time on price negotiations, we can estimate that the firms employing them incur close to one billion dollars in direct negotiation costs.
2. Costs associated with the outcomes: It has recently been argued that any notex-ante-agreed-upon outcome produces ill-will towards the trading partner and a reduction in gains from trade (Hart and Moore, 2008) . More generally, players may experience lingering negative (and counter-productive) sentiments towards past bargaining opponents.
3. Costs incurred in anticipation of bargaining. It is well-documented that betterinformed bargainers get better results (Busse, Silva-Risso, and Zettelmeyer, 2006) . While this result does not figure prominently in the theoretical literature, it is not hard to understand. The idea is that players, prior to bargaining, can invest to get information that will help them in the bargaining process. Unless equilibrium investments equal collusive investments, there will be a distortion, i.e. a bargaining cost. In most cases it seems natural to assume that the cost comes in the form of both players over-investing in jointly wasteful information.
Consistent with the importance of anticipatory bargaining costs, the abovementioned survey of purchasing managers found that they spent about 25% of their time "Preparing Bids" and "Researching Prices". At a more strategic level, players may refrain from suggesting improved trades in order to avoid bargaining or withhold information about such opportunities in order to protect their own future bargaining power (Simester and Knez, 2002) .
Costs of Posting Prices
In situations where a single seller faces several buyers, it is common for the former to post a price which is understood to be a take-it-or-leave-it offer. We once again list several costs of the process.
1. Direct costs of posting a price. Levy et al (1997) estimate the direct costs of changing a supermarket price to be $.52. Depending on the setting, additional costs may be incurred in order to communicate the prices to buyers. In the case of a large industrial supplier, Zbaracki et al (2004) find that the firm's total expense on pricing amounts to 1.22% of revenues.
2. Seller costs of managing several different prices. It is not unheard of for retailers to put all products in a small number of price classes in order to keep operations as simple as possible ("5 and 10", "Dollar Stores"). In the study of Zbaracki et al. (2004) , the costs of managerial information gathering, decision-making, and communication were much larger than the conventional menu-costs.
3. Buyers' reactions to facing several different prices. Several laboratory studies have suggested that buyers may purchase more when faced with fewer price classes (Chernev, 2006) . A recent field experiment by Bertini, Frederick and Simester (2006) , yielded similar results and the authors attribute this to buyers' aversion to making complex tradeoffs.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF OPTIMAL CLASSES
As noted in the previous Section, the costs of determining a price depend on the mechanism through which this is done e. g. by alternating offer bargaining or unilateral price posting. Since these costs contribute to the overall efficiencies of alternative pricedetermination mechanisms, attempts to economize on them should ideally take the endogeneity of the mechanism into account. However, to the extent that the nature of pricing costs varies between mechanisms, it would be very hard to perform a comparative analysis. We will therefore sidestep the issue and focus the analysis on unilateral priceposting only.
In our reduced form model, the cost of pricing is represented only by the total cost r that must be incurred on a per price basis. We endow the model with economies of scale by assuming that this cost is independent of the number of versions to which the price applies.
Preliminaries. The product comes in N possible versions, and if these are divided into K ≤ N classes, the parties incur total pricing costs Kr. There is one seller (he) and B potential buyers (she), each of whom buys one or no units of the product. Versions are indexed by n or q = 1, 2, …, N, classes by k or j = 1, 2, …, K, and buyers by b = 1, 2, …, B. The set of versions in class k is S k and we use p n to denote the price of version n, while p k is the price for any version in class k. We will use the notation n ∈ k as shorthand for n ∈ S k , such that n ∈ k implies that p n = p k .
To keep the effects of costly pricing separate from those of screening, we will initially assume that each buyer has very specific needs, such that only one version is "right" -has positive value -for any specific buyer (cf. Aghion and Tirole, 1997 Except in Section IV, we assume that the seller designs the classes while the buyer selects the version to be traded. The sequence of events is: 
In stage 2, the seller wants to find a number of classes K, a way to partition the N versions into these classes, S = (S 1 , S 2 , …, S K ), and a set of K prices to maximize the expected profits. With some abuse of notation, we use the Max S operator as shorthand for the first two steps, such that we can write the seller's problem as
While (2) in general is a very difficult problem, we have endowed it with sufficient structure to allow us to characterize the optimal solution in some detail.
First, since all buyers are ex ante identical, such that we can solve (2) at the level of a representative buyer, thus replacing the summation over B in favor of multiplication.
Second, since all versions have identical prior valuations, the ex ante choice probabilities depend only on p. All versions in a class will therefore have equal choice probabilities and the seller's expected per-buyer profits are
where │S k │ is the cardinality of S k and c k is the average cost of the versions in it. The optimal prices are then given by
and the partitioning problem is
While we are unable to solve this problem analytically, we can characterize its solution. Recalling that versions are labeled in order of increasing costs, we can label the classes such that the (average class) costs and profit maximizing prices p k * are increasing in k.
With these labels, if c q < c n , n∈ k and q∈ j, then j ≤ k. The object of quantization is to compress a finer scale into a smaller set of discrete categories, while retaining as much relevant information as possible and the object of clustering is to organize a set of elements into groups that are in some way similar. 4 As is well-known, a uniform taste distribution gives linear demand and it is this linearity that gives us the functional forms described in the Finding. So the best we can say is that the error committed by using the criterion will vanish as demand approaches linearity. The results obtained so far apply to the case in which all versions have identical prior demand, while ex post, each buyer assigns positive value to only one version.
Continuing to maintain the latter feature (and thus ruling out screening); we now consider the case in which versions have different prior demands as well as different costs.
Different prior demands, different costs
We incorporate demand differences by assuming that, if version n is right for b (such that rb = n), its value v rb is drawn from a commonly known distribution 
[c n /p][F n (P) -F n (p)]/[1 -F n (P)] -[1-F n (p)]/[1 -F n (P)] < [c n+1 /p] [F n+1 (P) -F n+1 (p)]/[1 -F n+1 (P)] -[1-F n+1 (p)]/[1 -F n+1 (P)] (MSC+LR) for all p∈ [0, 1], all P∈ [p, 1], and any n∈ {1, 2,..N-1}.
We will refer to these labels as "indices" of the corresponding versions. We adopt these labels.
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The sequence of events is as in subsection 1 and we can again represent the seller's problem by (2). Since the probability of v rb -p rb >0 is 1 -F rb ( p rb ), the seller's expected per-buyer profits are
The optimal prices are therefore given by
Proposition 2: It is never profit maximizing to have classes with interlacing index values.
Proof: See Appendix
Corollary 2: The optimal classes can be defined by index-intervals and class prices increase as average class indices goes up.
To see how the pricing cost rationale for class pricing interacts with the screening rationale, we now look at a simple example in which buyers treat products as substitutes.
Interaction between screening and pricing costs
To highlight the issues we look at a very simple example with three versions (N=3) and three buyers (B=3 Mussa and Rosen (1978) first demonstrated the possibility of this so-called "bunching" in the context of a screening model in which buyers differ in their taste for a single dimension. Later research has shown that bunching is extremely common in models with multi-dimensional screening (Renou, 2003) , essentially because the screener has too few instruments.
While screening distortions constitute a force towards class pricing, they are not 
(We ignore ties in order to keep the formalism down.) The sellers' problem is thus
In this problem, as in (2), weakly fewer prices will be charged for higher pricing costs.
Because of the complexity of (7), it is, however, very difficult to characterize the solution without making strong assumptions on the distribution of the valuations.
We will now look in some detail at a simple example in which we can identify the most efficient allocation of roles between buyer and seller.
IV. THE DIVISION OF ROLES BETWEEN BUYER AND SELLER
We have so far looked exclusively at the Seller-Design-Buyer-Choice game form, in which the seller designs the classes and sets the prices, after which the buyer chooses the version to be traded. Most examples use this game form, although there are exceptions, such as school district food contract, in which the buyer insists on vegetables, but gives the seller discretion to select any one of several different "seasonal vegetables".
It is not hard to understand why sellers, at least in B2C settings, almost invariably design the classes. If pricing is costly, it should be done by the thinner side of the market.
So to investigate the optimality of the Seller-Design-Buyer-Choice game form we look at a case in which the two sides of the market are symmetric in the sense that there is a single buyer and a single seller. The most appealing candidate is the symmetric alternative in which the buyer designs the classes and sets the prices after which the seller chooses the version to be traded.
There are, however, other possibilities as well. The two alternatives in which the same player designs and chooses are most easily thought of in a sequential sense in which (i) one player first designs the classes, (ii) the opponent then sets prices, and (iii) the first player finally chooses. In both of these cases, the design of the classes reflect private information (costs or values), which is not available to the player setting prices. The resulting jockeying for information-rents will burden both game forms with additional inefficiencies, and we will therefore ignore them in the following. The last two logical possibilities, in which the same player sets prices and chooses, are clearly very inefficient unless the opponent is given the right to refuse. Since this introduces factors not present in the simpler game forms, we will also ignore this last pair of alternatives.
Aiming to keep the analysis simple, we look at a case with two versions and assume that costs are binomial and I.I.D. across versions. In particular, values are γ∈ [0, ½] or 1-γ, each with probability ½, and costs are 1/3 or 2/3, also each with probability ½.
Noting that the buyer's valuations are more (less) varied than the seller's when γ < 1/3 (γ > 1/3), we will evaluate the relative efficiency of alternative game forms for varying values of γ relative to 1/3. The cost of determining a price is r ≥ 0.
Corollary 3: Classes in bilateral trades should be designed by the player with the less variable valuations, while the version traded should be chosen by the player with the more variable valuations.
Although classes in most examples are designed by the seller, the above result helps us make sense of this, and the exceptions. In particular, many incomplete contracts leave the give the seller latitude in determining the attributes about which the buyer cares little. One such example is home renovation contracts, which leave the contractor with the flexibility to make many minor decisions in light of local conditions. However, in most cases it is the buyer who cares more about which version is traded, and thus given the right to choose.
While this result has strong intuitive appeal and considerable face-validity, it clearly depends on trade being bilateral.
V. DISCUSSION
We have introduced the concept of class pricing as a response to the costs of assigning prices to large numbers of products. Class pricing is more likely to be used when the number of buyers is smaller, the number of versions is larger, the variance in costs is smaller, and demand ex ante differs less between versions. Sellers will define classes by cost-intervals and in a simple but natural case, the profit maximizing class design is that which minimizes the sum of squared within-class cost deviations. In bilateral trades, the most efficient game form is that in which classes are designed by the player with less varied gains from trade, while the traded version is chosen by the other player.
Once you start looking for it, class pricing is, as suggested by the examples in the opening paragraph of the paper, a very widely observed phenomenon. In many cases, (Jellybeans, haircuts, fast food,...) it is possible to argue that the aggregate implications of exactly identical prices are very similar to those of slightly differing prices. In other cases, (university educations, all-inclusive resorts,..) one could question the practice and probe its justification. Finally, there are some cases in which the implications are much less trivial.
It is possible to think of class pricing as an endogenously incomplete contract. We can define a very large set of versions by considering all levels of all attributes left out of the contract. Each of these attributes is often de facto left for a specific player to decide.
For example, in a home-renovation contract, it is understood that the buyer can select colors, while the seller decides on almost all hidden aspects of construction. According to the analysis presented here, these are attributes about which the deciding player cares the most. In contrast, the opponent is so indifferent that it simply is not worth it to negotiate different prices for all versions.
approximately optimal in a larger class of problems. If so, it would be much easier to do further work in the area. Secondly, while we have assumed a single seller throughout, it would be interesting to look at competitive class design. Suppose that there are many sellers with privately known costs drawn from the same commonly known distribution.
In this case, prices should go down, thus depressing the advantages of having more classes. If the per-seller costs of pricing stay the same, one would therefore expect fewer classes with more competition. Alternatively, a small number of sellers may be able to play an equilibrium in which they use different classes, allowing each to cater to its own market segment, much like in a model with spatial differentiation. Third, while we have focused on classes defined by identical unit prices, one could imagine a more general theory of classes defined by identical contracts. Employees work on hourly pay and most multi-product sales forces receive the same commission rate regardless of the product sold. This line may eventually lead to a theory of contractual simplicity. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would be interesting to test some of the predictions made in the paper, perhaps by exploiting different pricing practices between countries or across different periods in history.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1
If versions n and n + 2 are in class k, then version n + 1 should be in class k as well. To see this, note that if version n + 1 is in a higher priced class, it is traded with lower probability than version n + 2 implying that the seller could do better by switching the two versions. Similarly, if version n + 1 is in a lower priced class, it is traded with higher probability than version n. Q.E.D.
Proof of Finding 1
By substituting in the optimal class prices, p k* = ½ + c k /2, we find the ex ante expected per-buyer profits as
, and we can express the net advantage of class pricing as
The first term in (A2) reflects the saved pricing costs and the second the loss from less than optimal pricing of individual versions. The finding follows from rewriting (A2) as
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that version n + 1 is priced below version n, such that p n+1 = p and p n = P, where p < P. The seller's expected profit from these two versions is then
. This is higher than the profit from charging p for both versions if
and it is higher than the profits from charging P for both versions if
Taken together (A4) and (A5) require that
But this contradicts (MSC+LR). Q.E.D.
Proof of Finding 3
In the following, Eπ denotes the seller's expected profits, EU is the buyer's expected utility, and EL is the amount by which the sum of these falls short of the first best. We proceed mechanically and compare the performance of the two game forms for γ < 1/3 and γ > 1/3.
Case 1: γ < 1/3, Seller-Design-Buyer-Choice.
For K = 2, the profit maximizing prices, associated efficiency losses, and profits prior to pricing costs, are:
For K = 1, the profit maximizing price, associated efficiency losses, and profits prior to pricing costs, are: So the seller will ex ante prefer K = 2 if r < 1/48. However, the game form implements the first best for either value of K and thus for all values of r ≥ 0.
Case 2: γ < 1/3 Buyer-Design-Seller-Choice.
For K=2, the utility maximizing prices, associated efficiency losses, and utilities prior to pricing costs, are: 
